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This paper examines the optimal allocation of tax revenue among a universal transfer payment, a pure
public good and expenditure on education. Using a single-period framework, education expenditure
raises the productivity of individuals via a human capital production function. The social welfare
function is based on individuals’ (indirect) utilities. Education creates a substantial ﬁscal spillover
whereby the increase in human capital gives rise to higher labour earnings and thus higher income tax
revenue, thereby allowing greater government expenditure on all items than would otherwise be
possible. A higher inequality of exogenous ability levels is found to increase all types of expenditure,
but only the transfer increases in relative terms. Higher inequality aversion leads to an increase in
transfer payments in absolute and relative terms, at the expense of the other two components. However,
there is little sensitivity to inequality aversion. An increase in the elasticity of the wage with respect to
basic ability leads to lower education spending.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine the optimal allocation of government revenue among
three types of expenditure. These consist of a universal transfer payment, a pure public good
and expenditure on basic education, conditional on the tax rate. These expenditures have
differing effects on individuals’ labour supplies, which are considered to be endogenous. If
the choice is limited to the simpler case of expenditure on a public good and a transfer
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* We are grateful to referees for constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper.payment, it is known that a more unequal wage rate distribution results in relatively more
expenditure being devoted to the transfer payment.1 The question considered in this paper is
how the relationship between the composition of expenditure and basic inequality is affected
by the existence of tax-ﬁnanced education which raises individuals’ productivities.2
Judgements regarding the optimal expenditure composition have to balance the efficiency
effects of education expenditure, which inﬂuences the general level but not the inequality of
wage levels, with the inequality-reducing effect of the unconditional transfer. Education
creates a substantial ﬁscal spillover. Thus, the increase in human capital gives rise to higher
labour supply and higher earnings, as a result of the general increase in wage rates. This in
turn leads to higher income tax revenue, thereby allowing greater government expenditure
on all items than would otherwise be possible. It is also somewhat inequality-increasing. The
complex interactions involved mean that the nature of optimal plans are not at all obvious.
In a single-period framework, individuals are assumed to have similar preferences
regarding leisure, consumption goods (net income) and the public good, but are endowed
with an exogenously given ability level which differs among individuals. The education
expenditure is the same for all individuals and combines with the fundamental ability level
to raise the productivity of individuals, via a type of human capital production function.
The paper represents an exercise in welfare economics similar to investigations in the
optimal tax literature. However, it differs from standard analyses not only because of the
introduction of additional types of expenditure, but because emphasis is placed on the
composition of expenditure for a given tax rate. The tax rate is therefore assumed to be set by
other considerations, perhaps relating to perceptions of ‘taxable capacity’ and conventional
levels. Tax and expenditure decisions are thus treated as being set by different agencies,
related only through a budget constraint imposed on expenditure plans.3 Decisions may
perhaps be regarded as involving a two-stage procedure whereby ﬁrst a judgement is made
about the composition of expenditure for a given tax rate, and then secondly a judgement is
made about the tax rate, conditional on the optimal expenditure policy being adopted.4
It is well-known that standard optimal tax models do not give rise to closed-form
solutions, even for quite simple speciﬁcations of the tax structure and preferences. However,
in the present context it is possible, using a convenient approximation, to obtain explicit
solutions for the three expenditure levels, conditional on the tax rate. Nevertheless, the
properties of the model are not immediately transparent and for this reason the analysis of
comparative statics is reinforced by numerical examples.
There is considerable variation among countries in the composition of government
expenditure.5 The analysis may thus shed some light on the extent to which these differences
could arise from cultural factors, such as the extent of inequality aversion of policy makers,
or other factors such as tastes or productivity differences.
The framework of analysis is set out in Section 2, which derives individuals’ indirect
utility functions, expressed in terms of the expenditure levels.
42 JOHN CREEDY AND SOLMAZ MOSLEHIThe ﬁrst-order conditions for maximisation of the welfare function, giving the optimal
composition of expenditure, are set out in Section 3: further details of the derivation of
results are given in the Appendix. The results depend on a welfare-weighted average of basic
ability levels, resulting in nonlinear equations. Section 4 introduces an approximation which
allows explicit, or closed-form, solutions to be obtained. Comparative static analyses are car-
ried out in Section 5, which also provides some numerical examples. Brief conclusions are
in Section 6.
2. The Framework of Analysis
This section describes the basic framework of anaysis used. The model is static,
involving a single period, and individuals’ labour supplies respond to tax and expenditure
changes. Individual behaviour is described in subsection 2.1. The human capital production
function used to generate wage rates is discussed in subsection 2.2, followed in subsection
2.3 by derivation of the government’s budget constraint.
2.1. Individual Maximisation
Each individual maximises utility, U, regarded as a function of consumption, c, which,
assuming the price index of private goods is normalised to 1, is equivalent to net income,
leisure, h, and a tax-ﬁnanced public good, Q. Assume that U takes the Cobb-Douglas form,
where the individual subscript, i, is omitted for convenience:
U = cαhβQ1–α–β (1)
This widely-used form has, as seen below, the convenient property in the present context
that it leads to linear earnings functions relating earnings to the wage rate, thereby allowing
aggregation over all individuals to be carried out relatively easily.6
Tax revenue is obtained using a simple proportional income tax at the rate, t, and this is
used to ﬁnance a basic income (a non-means-tested transfer payment) of b per person. The
endowment of time is normalised to 1, so that h ￿ 1, and the wage rate is w. Hence the
budget constraint facing the individual is:
c + hw(1 –t ) = w(1 –t ) + b = M (2)
where M = w(1 –t ) + b is ‘full income’.
Using the standard properties of the Cobb-Douglas utility function, and deﬁning αﾴ =
α/(α + β) and βﾴ = β/(α + β), net income and leisure are:7
c = αﾴM (3)
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For the individual to work, w must exceed the threshold, wmin, needed to ensure h < 1,
where:
(5)
Gross earnings, y = w(1 − h), are:
(6)
Substituting the optimal values of c and h into the direct utility function gives indirect
utility, V, as:
(7)
2.2. Education and Wage Rates
The above results are expressed in terms of the individual’s wage rate. However, the
wage rate of each individual is itself endogenous because, in addition to ﬁnancing the
transfer payment and expenditure on the public good, tax revenue is used to provide public
education. This involves per capita expenditure on education of E. This provides an input
into a human capital production function which, along with each individual’s exogenous
basic ability level, w0, generates productivity as reﬂected in the wage rate, w. The production
function is also assumed to take the very simple Cobb-Douglas form, similar to that used by
Glomm and Ravikumar (1997, p. 188), whereby:
(8)
Hence the wage is proportional to a weighted average of the individual’s basic ability
level, w0, and the per capital expenditure on education, E. The production function does not
appear explicitly to allow for any time being spent on education, but the present approach
is consistent with an assumption that each individual spends the same amount of time in
education, as well as beneﬁting from the same government expenditure. Furthermore, this
time can be regarded as coming out of time otherwise devoted to leisure, and gives the same
utility as leisure. It therefore affects only the constant term in (8). The size of this constant
term is also affected by the units of measurement and mean of logarithms, ﾵw0, of the basic






























































44 JOHN CREEDY AND SOLMAZ MOSLEHIthe optimal expenditure shares. For this reason is it most convenient simply to set ʳ = 1 in
what follows.8
The speciﬁcation is similar in some respects to the kind of human capital production
function used in much of the endogenous growth literature, except that it necessarily does
not include either private investment by parents in childrens’ education or the human
capital of parents. For example, the form in Blankenau et al. (2007, p. 393) is the same as
(8) except that it has the human capital of the previous generation instead of w0.9 A further
difference is that in much of the growth literature, which involves a general equilibrium
context, the labour input into an aggregate production function is deﬁned in terms of
‘effective labour’ (a proportion of time devoted to labour multiplied by human capital), so
that only a single wage rate needs to be determined. In the present partial equilibrium
context, there is wage rate heterogeneity and individuals supply simply a number of
(unadjusted) hours of labour.
The function in (8) has the property, again in common with many studies in the context
of endogenous growth modes, that it does not specify a productivity externality. That is,
individuals do not receive any beneﬁt, in the form of a higher wage rate, from the fact that
other households may have more human capital. For example, complementarities in
production between low-skilled and high-skilled individuals may give rise to externalities
which raise the wage received by the low-skilled individuals.10 A speciﬁcation allowing for
a slightly different kind of externality is used by Angelopoulos et al. (2007, p. 6), and
papers cited therein, where individual human capital accumulation depends on, among
other things, arithmetic mean human capital. Of course, there are other types of externality
arising from education which are non-economic in nature, involving social and cultural
values, which are often used to justify tax-ﬁnanced public education, along with market
failure arguments concerning capital markets.
However, the present model contains a very important spillover effect. The tax-ﬁnanced
public education investment gives rise to higher incomes and hence a higher tax base. This
means that the relatively low-ability individuals face a lower tax rate and receive a higher
transfer payment than they would in the absence of the tax-ﬁnanced investment. This is
reﬂected in a higher social evaluation function (discussed below) which allows for both
equity and efficiency considerations.
2.3. The Government Budget Constraint
All government expenditure is assumed to be ﬁnanced from the proportional tax. Hence
the budget constraint can be written, where n is the number of individuals and p is the
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proportion of total wage (rates) and the proportion of people with w < wmin, gives arithmetic
mean earnings, y ﾯ, as:
(10)
where w ﾯ is the arithmetic mean wage rate. The expression in (10) is nonlinear since wmin
depends on the tax parameters. However, on the assumption that there are relatively few
non-workers, the terms F1 (wmin) and F (wmin) can be neglected, giving the linear form:
(11)
Substituting into (9) and rearranging gives the transfer payment expressed in terms of E
and Q, reﬂecting the fact that only two of the policy variables can be chosen independently.
Thus:
(12)
The average wage rate can be expressed in terms of basic abilities and public expenditure
on education. Using (8):
(13)
and writing as the moment of order ʸ (about the origin):
(14)
This can be substituted into (12) to give:
(15)
The government budget constraint therefore involves a loss of one degree of freedom in
the choice of policy instruments.
3. The Optimal Composition of Expenditure
The social planner is modelled as selecting values of Q, E and b, for an exogenously
given tax rate, in order to maximise a social welfare function, W, of the additive form:
b
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subject to the government’s budget constraint in (9), and where indirect utility can be written
as Vi = V (Q, E, b|t). Form the Lagrangean:
(17)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are thus:
(18)




From (10) the partial derivates in (18) are ∂y ﾯ /∂b = β´/(1 – t) and ∂y ﾯ /∂Q = 0 and ∂y ﾯ /∂E =




A procedure for solving these equations, along with the budget constraint, is presented
in the Appendix. This section therefore simply states the main results. First it is necessary to
deﬁne several terms. Letting , the term w ǜʸ is deﬁned as:
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This is a welfare-weighted average of the wʸ
0,i. Furthermore, deﬁne w ǆʸas another weighted
average:
(25)




A corresponding solution for b in terms of E can be obtained as:
(28)




Hence, for a given tax rate and the various parameters of utility functions and the
education production function, it is possible to solve for the optimal values of the policy
variables by ﬁrst using (29). In the Appendix, expressions for the optimal value of Q in terms
of E, and of b in terms of E and Q are derived: these can be used to obtain Q and b. Finally,
writing total government expenditure as T = pQ / n + b + E, gives, after simpliﬁcation:12
(31)
The ratio of each expenditure component to total expenditure can then be obtained. It is
easily seen that the resulting complex expressions are independent of the population size.
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48 JOHN CREEDY AND SOLMAZ MOSLEHIHowever, these expressions do not represent ‘closed form’ solutions because of their
nonlinearity and the complex form taken by w ǜʸ, which depends on the welfare weights and thus
the form of the social welfare function used. Further progress can be made using an explicit
form for W and an approximation for w ǜʸwhich allows explicit solutions to be obtained, making
the properties of the model clearer. This is examined in the following section.
4. The Welfare Weights
In examining the welfare-weighted average, w ǜʸ, it is clear that the term ˅i = ∂W/∂Vi
∂Vi/∂b, and hence the weight ˅' i, is highly complex even for simple forms of W. For example,
suppose the social planner maximizes an additive social welfare function with iso-elastic
weights applied to the Vi such that:
(32)
where ʵ is the degree of concavity of the weighting function and represents the degree of
constant relative inequality aversion of the planner. Hence ∂W/∂Vi = Vi
−ʵ and substituing for
V from (1), along with ∂Vi/∂b from (3) gives an awkward expression for ∂W/∂Vi ∂Vi/∂b.
It can be shown that, if b is relatively small (in comparison with average earnings), a
reasonable approximation to w ǜʸ can be based on an equally distributed equivalent measure.
In general for the variable, x, the ‘equally distributed equivalent’ value, xe, is the value
which, if obtained by everyone, gives the same welfare, deﬁned in terms of x, as the actual
distribution. This concept is associated with the Atkinson measure of inequality, A, which is
expressed as the proportional difference between the arithmetic mean and the equally
distributed equivalent value, so that:
(33)
Using an iso-elastic welfare function, such as (32), expressed in terms of x, xe is:
(34)
Furthermore, if x is lognormally distributed as ʛ(ﾵ, ˃2), then x1-ʵ is lognormally
distributed as ʛ((1 –ʵ ) ﾵ, (1 –ʵ ) 2 ˃2) and using the result for the arithmetic mean of a
lognormal variable (see Aitchison and Brown, 1957), (34) becomes:































































This allows the implications of alternative degrees of inequality aversion to be examined.
Using these results it is possible to show, after much manipulation, that the mean of
logarithms, ﾵw0, cancels from the expenditure ratios, E/T, (pQ/n)/T and b/T. It is clearly
convenient that the ratios do not depend on the unit of measurement, though of course the
absolute values do depend on ﾵw0.
5. Numerical Examples
Previous sections have obtained explicit results regarding the optimal values of
expenditure components. However, the complexity of the expressions means that the
comparative static properties are not transparent. The present section therefore uses
numerical examples to reinforce discussion of the model’s properties. First, suitable
parameter values for calibration are outlined, after which the effects of varying a range of
parameters are examined. These include the elasticity of the wage rate with respect to basic
ability, ʸ, the inequality of the basic ability level, ˃2
w0, the degree of inequality aversion of
the judge, ʵ, and the exogenously ﬁxed tax rate, t.
5.1 Calibration of The Model
In selecting basic parameter values it is necessary ﬁrst to ensure that they give rise to
sensible values of the proportion of time devoted to labour supply. Using preference
parameters of α = 0.5 and β = 0.4, along with a tax rate of t = 0.35, the proportion of time
devoted to labour supply, at the arithmetic mean wage rate, is around 0.58. Furthermore, it is
necessary to consider values of ʸ which, along with other parameters, give rise to positive
values of the transfer payment, b, and reasonable absolute and relative values of expenditure.
In the following numerical examples, ʸ is allowed to vary between 0.75 and 1: the latter
corresponds to the case where education expenditure has no role in generating ability levels.13
As a benchmark case, individuals’ basic ability levels, wʸ, are assumed to follow a
lognormal distribution with variance of logarithms, ˃2
w0 = 0.36 and mean of logarithms, ﾵw0 = 3,
remembering that the latter affects only absolute values of expenditure.























50 JOHN CREEDY AND SOLMAZ MOSLEHIIn calibrating this type of model it is difficult to obtain obvious empirical counterparts.
For example it may be thought that estimates of labour supply elasticities could be used, but
there is no single elasticity from which calibration can be based. The approach adopted with
this kind of exercise is to ensure that the orders of magnitude of certain important variables
make sense, such as the labour supplied by the individual with arithmetic mean wage rate,
and typical values of expenditure on consumption. Extensive sensitivity analyses were
carried out to ensure that results presented are fully representative and do not arise from
pathological cases. With the benchmark parameters mentioned here, the absolute values of
expenditure on education, public goods, and the transfer payment in all reported results have
reasonable magnitudes, in relation to approximate observed values.14
5.2. Comparative Statics
Consider ﬁrst the inﬂuence of ˃2
w on the optimal composition of government
expenditures. From the human capital production function (8) the variance of logarithms of
wage rates is ˃2
w = ʸ2˃2
w0 and is not affected by E, which is the same for everyone. It is,
however, inﬂuenced by ʸ, which also governs the extent to which education expenditure
contributes to human capital, 1 − ʸ. In the following discussion, it is convenient to deﬁne the
term G = pQ as the expenditure on the public good.
A higher value of ˃2
w0 has two effects. First, ceteris paribus, it increases the arithmetic
mean value of w and hence average earnings.
(38)
This gives rise to a higher total revenue, which allows all types of expenditure to
increase. The higher E also reinforces the effect on average earnings, though it is moderated
somewhat by the increase in b. Secondly, an inequality averse planner makes the
expenditure pattern more redistributive, so that b increases relative to G/n and E. Hence
optimal (G/n)/T and E/T fall, despite their absolute increase, while b/T increases. However,
all these effects are relatively small given that ˃2
w0 is only a small component of the
arithmetic mean wage.
The way in which optimal shares vary as ˃2
w0 increases is shown in Figure 1. The top
panel illustrates variations in the share of expenditure on education, E/T, with changes in ˃2
w0;
the middle panel shows how the ratio of optimal public goods expenditure per person to total
expenditure, (G/n)/T, varies; and the lower panel shows how the share of transfer payments
varies with ˃2
w0. In each case the variations are obtained for an inequality aversion coefficient
of ʵ = 0.8, and proﬁles are shown for four values of the parameter, ʸ. The effects of
variations in ˃2
w0 are seen to be similar for all values of ʸ. That is, proﬁles of optimal
expenditure components and shares, as ˃2
w0 varies, are simply shifted upwards or downwards
by increases or decreases in ʸ.
% wE ww w w =+ () =+ − () + ( exp exp log . ﾵ σθ ﾵ θ θ σ
22 2
00 10 5 ) )
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Figure 1. The Optimal Composition and Variations in the Variance of Initial Wage53 The optimal composition of government expenditure among transfers, education and public goods
Figure 2. The Optimal Composition and Variations in Inequality AversionAn increase in inequality aversion, ʵ, does not have a similar effect to that of an increase
in basic inequality, ˃2
w0, because the latter affects arithmetic mean earnings and hence tax
revenue. The increase in ʵ increases the difference between w ǜʸ and w ﾯ ʸ. The desire for a more
redistributive policy on the part of the planner leads to an increase in b, in absolute and
relative terms, at the expense of E and Q. Thus b and b/T increase while Q, E, (G/n)/T and
E/T all fall slightly. Again, these effects are small and are similar for all values of ʸ. The
three panels of Figure 2 show in turn the relationship between ʵ and the optimal E/T, (G/n)/T
and b/T, again for diffferent values of ʸ. In each case the variation in the budget share, as
inequality aversion increases, is small. Hence different planners may have very different
degrees of inequality aversion and yet would display little disagreement concerning optimal
expenditure shares. It is clear that the value of ʸ, inﬂuencing the role of education in
generating ability levels, is much more important. This is discussed next.
The effect of an increase in ʸ is to produce an investment effect. This arises from the
fact that a higher ʸ implies that education is less effective in raising the average level of
productivity. This leads to the planner reducing E in absolute terms. In the limit, a value of
ʸ = 1 means that education plays no role in determining w, so that there is no point in
investing in education and optimal E falls to zero. Hence the investment effect of variations
in ʸ can be expected to be quite substantial. The consequent reduction in education spending,
in absolute and relative terms as ʸ increases, leaves more tax revenue available for spending
on transfer payments and the public good, despite the associate reduction in average
earnings. However, the reduction in average earnings via the term (1 − ʸ)logE is modiﬁed to
a small extent by the effect of higher ʸ in raising w ﾯ for given E, via the terms ʸﾵw0 and
0.5ʸ2˃2
w0 in equation (38). The last term is similar to the effect of increasing inequality, while
the effect on w ﾯ operating via ﾵw0 is known to have no effect on relative orders of magnitude.
Figure 3 shows the variation in optimal E/T, (G/n)/T and b/T with ʸ, while Figure 4 shows
the variation in the absolute levels of E, G/n and b.
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Figure 3. The Optimal Composition and Variations in the Variance of Initial Wage55 The optimal composition of government expenditure among transfers, education and public goods
Figure 4. The Optimal Composition and Variations in the Efficiency Parameter ʸ ʸThese diagrams show that the overall effect of increasing ʸ is to reduce optimal E and
E/T while raising G, b, G/T and b/T . In view of the significant investment effect of variations
in ʸ, this parameter has a much larger effect on policy variables than inequality aversion or
basic inequality. The ratios appear to be approximately linearly related to ʸ, but this property
is far from evident from the corresponding analytical expressions.
The  above  discussion  relates  to  changes  in  parameters  and  their  effects  on  optimal
expenditure patterns for a given tax rate, which is assumed to be set exogenously. Clearly, a
minimum value of t is necessary in order to ensure that the transfer payment is positive, given
that some non-transfer expenditure is carried out, otherwise the inequality-reducing beneﬁt
becomes the equivalent of a regressive poll tax. It is useful to consider how the optimal
composition varies as the tax rate varies. First, the incentive effect of an increasing tax rate,
ceteris paribus, reduces average earnings. Initially, the increasing ‘tax rate’ effect of a higher
rate outweighs the falling ‘tax base’ effect, so that total revenue rises. However, for higher tax
rates, further increases lead to a reduction in total revenue as the falling tax base effect
dominates. This kind of effect is of course familiar. Hence an inequality averse planner would
raise the transfer payment as the tax rate is increased – but only to the extend that this is made
possible  by  the  revenue  effect.  It  has  been  mentioned  that  increasing  the  tax  rate  has  a
disincentive effect on labour supply, thereby reducing average earnings. The return from
investing in education is therefore lower, so an increase in t has the effect of lowering the
optimal value of E. The effect of increasing b and reducing E means that eventually as the tax
rate is increased, Q can in principle turn negative: such a ‘public bad’ does not make sense in
the present framework, thereby imposing an upper limit on the tax rate. The relationship
between the tax rate and the optimal share of expenditure on education, public goods and
transfer payments are shown in the three panels of Figure 5. In each case variations are
illustrated for four different values of the parameter, ʸ, in the education production function.
6.  Conclusions 
This paper has examined the optimal allocation of tax revenue among a universal transfer
payment, a pure public good and expenditure on education. Using a single-period framework,
individuals were assumed to have similar preferences but to be endowed with an exogenously
given  heterogeneous  ability  level.  The  education  expenditure  raises  the  productivity  of
individuals, via a type of human capital production function. The social welfare function was
based on individuals’ (indirect) utilities, and reﬂecting a degree of relative inequality aversion.
Judgements regarding optimal expenditure therefore have to balance the efficiency effects of
education  expenditure  (which  does  not  reduce  wage  rate  inequality),  with  the  inequality
reducing effect of the transfer. In this framework, education creates a substantial ﬁscal spillover
whereby the increase in human capital gives rise to higher labour supply earnings and thus
higher income tax revenue, thereby allowing greater government expenditure on all items than
would otherwise be possible. Explicit solutions were obtained for the expenditure levels.
However, in view of the complexity of the expressions, comparative static properties of the
model were reinforced by numerical examples.
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Figure 5. Optimal Expenditure Shared and Variations in the Tax RateA higher inequality of exogenous ability levels was found to increase average earnings.
The  higher  total  revenue  allows  all  types  of  expenditure  to  increase.  Secondly,  higher
inequality aversion makes the expenditure pattern more redistributive, so that the transfer
payment increases relative to public good and education expenditure, despite their absolute
increase. However, these effects are relatively small. 
The desire for a more redistributive policy leads to an increase in transfer payments in
absolute and relative terms, at the expense of the other two components. The variation in budget
shares, as inequality aversion increases, is small. Hence different independent judges may have
very  different  degrees  of  inequality  aversion  and  yet  would  display  little  disagreement
concerning optimal expenditure shares.
The effect of an increase in the coeffient on basic ability in the human capital production
function (the elasticity of the wage with respect to basic ability) is to produce an investment
effect.  First,  it  implies  that  education  is  less  effective  in  raising  the  average  level  of
productivity, which leads to the planner reducing education spending in absolute terms.
Ultimately, as the coefficient approaches unity, education plays no role, so the investment
effect  of  such  variations  are  expected  to  be  substantial.  The  consequent  reduction  in
education spending, in absolute and relative terms, leaves more tax revenue available for
spending  on  transfer  payments  and  the  public  good,  despite  the  associate  reduction  in
average earnings. In view of the signiﬁcant investment effect of variations in this elasticity,
this parameter has a much larger effect on policy variables than inequality aversion or basic
inequality.
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Notes
1. See Creedy and Moslehi (2009). In a standard optimal tax model, where income tax ﬁnances a universal
transfer payment, it is well-known that a higher inequality of ability (and hence wage rates) is associated with
choice of a higher tax rate, and hence a more redistributive policy. The same is true of majority voting models,
in the tradition of early work of Meltzer and Richard (1981). See the survey by Borck (2007). 
2. To avoid other issues associated with educational choice, private education is not modelled here.
3. Tridimas (2001, p. 308) suggests that, ‘This is less restrictive than it ﬁrst appears, since in practice governments
are often constrained in the policy instruments that they may vary at any one time’. 
4. Such a sequential approach is used in voting models of government expenditure, in view of the complexities
involved in voting over more than one dimension. On such two stage voting in a public choice context, see
McCaleb (1985) who emphasises uncertainties involved during the ﬁrst stage. 
5. Some comparisons are given in Creedy and Solmaz (2009). 
6. It is shown in subsection (3) that with this form of utility function the expenditure shares do not depend on
population size. Furthermore, the shares are independent of units, and thus the average wage.
7. In the standard case, expenditure on any item is the product of full income and the ratio of the relevant
coefficient to the sum of coefficients. In the present context, the term Q1–α–β must be treated effectively as a
constant term in the utility function, because Q does not have a corresponding consumer price (only a ‘tax
price’). Thus, for example in (3), full income is multiplied by α / (α + β) rather than α. 
8. Allowing for individuals to choose an amount of time spent in education, and supposing that this does not give
direct utility, gives rise to a highly nonlinear solution for the supply of labour. 
9. In Capolupo (2000, p. 168), human capital accumulation is determined purely by government education
expenditure and an efficiency term. 
10. This type of externality is explored at length in Creedy (1995), in the different context of the choice of higher
education (considered as a private investment good). 
11. In the special case where inequality aversion is zero, w ǜθ = w  θ = w ǆθ and it can be seen that Q = 0 when w  = E. 
12. Total tax revenue is ty  , and comparing this with pG/n + b + E provides a useful independent check on
computations, such as those reported below. 
13. Strictly, results are undeﬁned for θ = 1, so the upper limit in practice is set at 0.999. 
14. As mentioned earlier, an independent check on total tax revenue, resulting from arithmetic mean earnings, and
the sum of expenditure on education, public goods and the transfer payment, conﬁrmed both the accuracy of
the analytical expression and the computations.
15. Unfortunately, H is not a weighted average of the two terms involving w. 
16. Alternatively it is possible to write E–θ = (1 – α – β)(ʨ–1 – 1) + (1 – θ)β(ʨ – 1) / (1 – θ)(A1w ǜθ + A2w ǜθ),
where A1 = (1 – α – β)(1 – βﾴ)ʨ–1(1 – t(1 + βﾴ)) + βtʨ(1 – t(1 – βﾴ)) and A2 = (1 – α – β)(1 – βﾴ)ʨ–1t – βt(1
– βﾴ) + βt2ʨ(1 – βﾴ). Unfortunately A1 + A2  ≠ 1.
59 The optimal composition of government expenditure among transfers, education and public goodsResumen
Este trabajo analiza la asignaci￳n ￳ptima de los ingresos fiscales entre una transferencia universal, un
bien p￺blico puro y el gasto p￺blico en educaci￳n. Utilizando un marco temporal de un ￺nico periodo,
el gasto en educaci￳n incrementa la productividad de los individuos modificando el capital humano en
la funci￳n de producci￳n. La funci￳n de bienestar social se basa en las utilidades indirectas de los
individuos. La educaci￳n crea externalidades fiscales importantes, por lo que el incremento del capital
humano incrementa los salarios y, por tanto, la recaudaci￳n fiscal, lo que permite incrementar el gasto
gubernamental en general.  Una mayor desigualdad en los niveles de habilidad ex￳genos incrementa
todos los tipos de gasto, pero solo la transferencia universal aumenta en t￩rminos relativos. Una mayor
aversi￳n a la desigualdad lleva a incrementar las transferencias en t￩rminos absolutos y relativos, a
costa de los otros dos componentes. En todo caso, la sensibilidad a la aversi￳n a la desigualdad es
peque￱a. Un incremento de la elasticidad de los salarios respecto a las habilidades b￡sicas lleva a
reducciones del gasto educativo.
Palabras clave: gasto p￺blico, bienes p￺blicos, educaci￳n, transferencias, bienestar social.
Clasificación JEL: H31, H41, H52, H53, H75
Appendix: Solving the First-Order Conditions
This appendix derives explicit (closed-form) solutions for the policy variables, Q, b and
E, conditional on the income tax t.
Partial Derivatives of Indirect Utility
First, it is necessary to obtain expressions for the ratios of partial derivatives of the
indirect utility function. Substituting for w = γwʸ
0E1-ʸ and M = w(1 – t) + b into (7), the
indirect utility function can be written, again omitting i subscripts for convenience, as:
(1)
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and:
(6)
Substituting (6) and (5) into the relevant ﬁrst-order conditions gives:
(7)
(8)
Solutions for Optimal Q and b
Consider ﬁrst the two-dimensional choice of b and Q, for given E. This is equivalent to
the requirement that a social indifference curve is tangential to the budget constraint, which
is obtained by dividing (7) by (21). Writing ˅ﾴ i = ˅i/ʣi ˅i gives:
(9)
However, using (8) to substitute for w, the left hand side of (9) becomes:
(10)
Let w ǜʸ = ʣi ˅ﾴ i wʸ
0,i, a welfare-weighted average of wʸ
0 (the weighted moment of order ʸ
about the origin). Hence, rearrangement of (9) gives:
(11)
This result expressed the basic income in terms of the expenditure on the public good
and on education per person. Using the government budget constraint, that is setting (11)
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61 The optimal composition of government expenditure among transfers, education and public goodsThis result can be simpliﬁed as follows. Denoting the denominator by ʨ−1, it can be seen
that ʨ can be expressed as:
(13)
Furthermore, deﬁne w ǆʸ as the weighted average:
(14)
This allows (12) to be written more succinctly as:
(15)
This expresses pQ/n in terms of E only. A corresponding solution for b in terms of E can
be obtained by substituting for pQ/n, using (15), into (11), whereby:
(16)
It therefore remains to solve for E. This is described in the following subsection.
Solving for Optimal E
Consider,  for  given  Q,  the choice  between  b and  E,  involving  a tangency  solution
between  a  social  indifference  curve  and  the  budget  constraint,  when  taking  the  two
dimensions b and E. Thus, divide (8) by (21), and again use (8) to express wage rates in




However,  from  the  result  for  b in  terms  of  E in  (16),  the  required  ratio  in  (18)
becomes:
(19)
Hence, collecting terms in E–θ and rearranging gives: 
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Where H is:15
(21)
Taking right hand side of (20), dividing numerator and denominator by 1 − t (1 + βﾴ),
and using the fact that:
(22)
the solution for E is given by the result in (29).16 The resulting value of E can then be
substituted into (15) to obtain the optimal value of Q. Finally, these values of E and Q can
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